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Solving the model
We solve the model backwards discretizing along a, and h. Choosing the optimal health level from a grid allows us to substitute health expenditures m j out of the optimization problem via the law of motion of health
Instead of choosing how much to spend on health in period j, the consumer picks the new health level h j directly. Health expenditure m j is then the obtained via the following expression
This method turns out to be simpler than picking m j directly, since that would require an additional discretization over m j . An alternative specification would be to let depreciation be a function of current health expenditures, δ (m j ) . However, if the function δ (m j ) is nonlinear we cannot easily solve for m j anymore which would increase the computational burden. We therefore limit the depreciation of health to only be a function of the current age j. We solve the model backwards using a grid search over all states {a j , h j−1 , in j , ε j , ǫ j , i GI,j }. The algorithm follows the steps given below 1. Discretize x j = {(a j , h j−1 , in j , ε j , ǫ j , i GI,j )} according to
• a = [0, ..., 3] 1×30
• h = [0.01, ..., 3.5] 1×16
• age = [20, ..., 90] 1×14
• ins = {0, 1, 2}
• ε h j = ε h 1 , ε h 2 , ε h 3 , where j = {1, ..., 9} income shocks • ε l j = ε l 1 , ε l 2 , ε l 3 , where j = {1, ..., 9} health shocks • i GI,j = {0, 1} , where j = {1, ..., 9} employer provided health insurance (yes/no) 2. Guess prices w, R, p, p M ed , tax rates τ M ed , τ Soc , and an initial capital stock K old 3. Solve the model backwards for optimal policy functions a * (x j ) , c * (x j ) , l * (x j ) , m * (x j ) , and in * (x j ) assuming that savings in the last period are equal to zero 4. Solve forward: track agent masses over all states assuming that newborn generations have very low asset holdings at the beginning of their economic life at age 20 and store the distribution in an array µ W and µ R , for workers and retirees respectively (this method does not allow us to track individual agent histories) Asset and health spending grids are coarse and are likely to influence the comparative static results. The forward solving part of the algorithm can be improved upon by simulating the health shock and survival history of a large number of households. This method would then allow us to condition policies on agent income histories, a feature that is not captured by the current solution method.
Welfare calculations
In this section we provide details about the two welfare measures. We start with the following observation. When calculating the compensating consumption levels that equate an agent's utility as measured by her value function from the original steady state V with the value function from the new regime W , we can express the consumption levels needed as percentage φ of the current consumption levels. If an agent is worse of in the new regime, she needs to be given extra quantities of consumption, so that φ > 0. If, on the other hand, the agent is better off under the new regime, then φ < 0.
In addition we compensate the agent with fraction φ of her consumption in all of her life periods, so that the two value functions V (before the regime change) and W (after the regime change) become identical. In other words, we equate
where superscripts denote regime 1 (before the change) and regime 2 respectively, the subscript denotes the agent's age, x l j = {(a j , h j−1 , in j , ε j , ǫ j , i GI,j )} is the state vector summarizing asset holdings, health capital, the insurance state, the health shock, the income shock, and the employer matching state of a j period old agent in regime l, and t is the calendar time when the agent is born. Using the above described functional form for preferences we have
Plugging this into the post reform value function we get
We can now equate the value function from before and from after the reform
The proportional increase in consumption can be computed analytically for each agent type over the transitions by
We have reported two welfare measures. The first measures the fraction of aggregate compensating consumption per aggregate consumption for each generation t over the transition period. This measure allows us to identify which generations on average stand to win or lose from the reform. We can write this measure as
where transition generation τ = −13 is the generation born 13 periods before the reform. This generation has one period j = 14, left to live under the new policy regime. Generation τ = 0 is the first generation born under the new regime at calendar time t. The second welfare measure calculates how much it would cost to compensate the individuals over the transition period in order to make them indifferent between the current U.S. economy and the equilibrium with health insurance vouchers. We express this cost in terms of fraction of GDP. Formally this can be expressed as 3.2 Health Expenditure, Healthy Individuals, and Insurance Profiles Figure 1 presents the life-cycle profiles of annual health expenditure, annual total income, medical expenditure to income ratio, and average weekly work hours.
The expenditure definition in MEPS refers to what is paid for health care services. More specifically, expenditures are defined as the sum of direct payments for care provided during the year, including out-of-pocket payments and payments by private insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and other sources. Payments for over-the-counter drugs are not included in MEPS total expenditures. Indirect payments not related to specific medical events, such as Medicaid Disproportionate Share and Medicare Direct Medical Education subsidies, are also not included (This definition is from MEPS documentation HC-097: 2005 pp. C-106ff). Figure 2 presents the life-cycle profiles of health status, where we define a healthy individual as a person with a health status of excellent, very good, or good. Persons with health status of fair and poor are considered unhealthy. Figure 3 reports the insurance status over all age groups. We distinguish between no insurance, public insurance only, and some private insurance. In figure 4 we describe individuals with private insurance bought in the individual market and individuals with group insurance (from their employers). Group insurance are variable HELD31X, HELD42X, and HELD53X). The variable for type of health insurance coverage is INSCOVyy (where yy=05 for 2005).
MEPS data also contains data on who was offered group insurance (variables OF-FER31X, OFFER42X, and OFFER53X) which allows us to calculate take up ratios.
Methodology 3.3.1 Markov transition matrix for working ability/efficiency units
We measure the individuals' working ability/efficiency unit in terms of the hourly wage rate (labor income per hour) of individuals, or Hourly wage = Gross labor income Total hours worked .
We classify individuals into 3/5 quantiles of hourly wage rates and J w = 9 separate five year age cohorts. The cohorts assumed to be active in the labor market are: 20 − 24, 25 − 29, 30 − 34, 35 − 39, 40 − 44, 45 − 49, 50 − 54, 55 − 59, and 60 − 64. We assume that individuals in each age-quantile group have identical working abilities, so that each cohort consists of 3/5 discrete states of productivity. To measure the discrete levels of working ability we use the average hourly wage rate conditioning on the income quantile and on age. We can therefore write the productivity of an individual age j in income group i as
where i denotes the income class, j denotes the age-cohort, and e i j is the level of working ability (average working ability within income/age class), and N i j is the total number of individuals of cohort age j and income i. We report graphs of the average productivity profiles per income group in figure 4 We use a Markov transition matrix to characterize the dynamics of working abilities over the life cycle. One often used method is a simple counting approach to calculate the transition probabilities (e.g. Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) or Jeske and Kitao (2009) ). We record the number of individuals in income class 1 of cohort 1 and then count how many of those stayed in income class 1 in the next period and how many moved to income classes 2 − 3/5 in the next period. We then get the transition probability p i ′ ,i j of an individual of age j in income class i who moves to income class i ′ when age is j + 1 as
where N i j is the total number of individuals with working ability i at age j, n i ′ |i j+1 is the number if individuals of pool N i j who have working ability i ′ in the next period j + 1. Note that all individuals with working ability i ′ in period j + 1 can be calculated as
. We report the number of individuals in each productivity class per age cohort in table 2 and summary statistics of labor productivities of all individuals that report income data in two consecutive years in table 3.
Since we assume that each period in the model corresponds to five years, we need to calculate the transition probability matrix of working abilities for 5 − year periods. We assume that the transition probabilities are constant for a five year span and therefore express the labor productivity transition matrix of an individual of age j for one period (of five years) as the matrix product
where P j1 is the annual transition matrix with elements p k,i j .
Markov transition matrix for health states
We group agents in the MEPS data into healthy and sick types according to their self reported health status. We define agents with health status excellent, very good, and good as healthy agents whereas agents with a self reported health status of f air and poor are defined as sick agents. We then calculate the transition probabilities of going from one health state to another for each age group j. The transition probabilities are stored in matrix P (ε j , ε j−1 ) and we report the 14 matrices in table 15. 
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